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#2A-12/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION OF THE PAID FIRE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, 
NEW YORK, INC., LOCAL 628 IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging- Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11586 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
Respondent. 
DeSOYE & REICH (FREDERICK K. REICH, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY (JOHN F. O'REILLY, ESQ. and 
KATHRYN G. ROSADO, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on the exceptions of the Mutual 
Aid Association of the Paid Fire Department of the City of 
Yonkers, New York, Inc., Local 628 IAFF, AFL-CIO (Local 628) 
to the Director's dismissal of its charge against the City of 
Yonkers (City) which alleges that the City violated 
§209-a.l(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when its City Manager sent a letter to 
all unit employees with their retroactive paychecks. 
Local 628 alleges that the letter is coercive and interferes 
with both its own and the unit employees* statutory rights. 
The Director determined that the letter was an 
expression of opinion which neither threatened reprisal nor 
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promised benefits and was, therefore, a privileged 
communication under our decision in City of Albany. 1/ 
Local 628 argues that the language of the letter coupled 
with the circumstances surrounding its issuance are enough to 
avoid a Director's dismissal. Local 628 emphasizes that the 
letter accompanied the very paychecks in issue. It argues 
further that the salary payments, which covered a two-year 
period of time, were very important to the unit employees, as 
evidenced by its efforts to get the retroactivity paid 
promptly, efforts which included both discussions with the 
City's representatives and a public demonstration after the 
arbitration award was issued in October 1989. From this 
perspective, Local 628 concludes that the letter threatens 
employees by stating or implying that Local 628 was 
responsible for delaying the salary increases, that the City 
controls the employees' financial destiny and that too 
aggressive a union leadership will anger the City, which will 
have adverse consequences for the employees. The City argues 
in response that the Director was correct in his 
characterization of the letter and in his dismissal of the 
charge. 
The letter in issue, dated December 14 and signed by the 
City Manager, is on City letterhead and reads as follows: 
i/l7 PERB ^3068 (1984). 
^ 
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Dear Firefighters: 
Enclosed please find your retro-active [sic] 
pay for the period January 1987 through to 
November 23, 1989. I am genuinely gratified that 
my staff, and that of the Fire Department, were 
able through their combined efforts, to get this 
money to Oou [sic] in time for the holidays. I 
know how difficult the last few years must have 
been for you and your familxes. 
But I would be remiss if I didn't clarify my 
position regarding the issuance of these checks in 
light of the recent demonstration by 628 and 
subsequent comments by President Pagano. The 
simple fact is that a short time ago, Mr. Pagano 
and I met at a local restaurant wherein, knowing 
that the arbitrators decision was imminent, he 
asked, on your behalf, if he could get a commitment 
from me to process your retro payments without the 
usual bureaucratic delays. I gave him my personal 
word with a handshake that night that I would do 
everything in my power to insure these payments 
could be processed as soon as possible. It has 
been only several weeks since we received the 
arbitration award and the proof that I have kept my 
word to 628 is in this envelope. Any information 
you received that may have led you to believe 
otherwise is, in fact, either a blatant lie or a 
purposeful distortion of the truth. Comments such 
as "let the games begin" are clearly not my style. 
I have never, and will never, "play games" with any 
City employees' paychecks because I know how 
important it is to make ends meet and to support a 
family adequately. 
No one, not Union Leader, nor City Manager 
should ever use salary earned and owed as a 
bargaining chip. I am sincerely sorry that 
Mr. Pagano put you in the middle of the 
difficulties he is having with my administration. 
Although I respect your right to engage in the 
orderly and appropriate expression of your feelings 
on City issues, I will simply not tolerate blatant 
lies or purposeful distortions on the part of any 
City employee. This is especially true for a union 
representative who has been given the trust of the 
membership to represent their concerns and 
interests in a professional manner. 
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Finally, what's most important is that the 
checks are here. You deserve them and I am truly 
delighted that my staff was able to get them to you 
before my Christmas deadline. 
I wish you and your families a happy and 
healthy holiday season. 
This appeal is from a Director's dismissal pursuant to 
§204.2(a) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules). In that 
posture, the issue before both the Director and this Board is 
whether the facts as alleged in the charge may constitute an 
improper practice. In making that determination, both 
parties agree, correctly, that a charging party is entitled 
to all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the 
pleaded facts.-2/ Having reviewed Local 628's exceptions, we 
hold that the Director properly dismissed the charge because 
the letter, whether read in isolation or in the context of 
the circumstances alleged, does not constitute a violation of 
the Act. 
As relevant to the disposition of this case, our 
decision in City of Albany privileges an employer's 
noncoercive communication to unit employees. We interpret 
the City Manager's letter as did the Director. It is by its 
terms, and in context, nonthreatening and represents the City 
^•/county of Nassau, 17 PERB ?[3013 (1984) ; Professional 
Firefighters Ass'n, Local 274, 23 PERB ^3021 (1990). These 
cases involved dismissals by Administrative Law Judges at 
different stages of litigation, but the principles are 
equally applicable to the Director's initial processing of a 
charge under §2 04.2 of the Rules. See Jacob K. Javits 
Convention Center, 19 PERB [^4626 (1986), aff'd, 20 PERB [^3030 
(1987). 
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Manager's opinionated response to what he considered to be a 
distortion by Local 628's president of the facts surrounding 
the salary payments and his effort to clarify his position on 
that issue. The Act does not prohibit such statements 
whether made by an employer or by a union. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member ( 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HARRY G. ZINK, 
Charging Party, 
and CASE NO^ U-1I739 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
LOCAL 891, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, 
Respondents. 
HARRY G. ZINK, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Harry G. 
Zink to the Director's dismissal of his charge against the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York (District) and Local 891, International Union of 
Operating Engineers (IUOE) which alleges unspecified 
violations of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). 
Zink was employed for several years by the City of New 
York as a stationary engineer. In April 1989, he was 
appointed by the District from a civil service open-
competitive list to the position of District custodian. Zink 
was considered to be a new employee on his appointment by the 
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District and was paid 3 0% less than the assigned salary for 
the custodian title. 
Zink believes that he should be treated as a transferred 
employee for salary purposes, as he—is—for pension—purposes7 
because of his prior service with the City of New York. On 
Zink's inquiry to the District and IUOE, however, he was 
informed that the District's and IUOE's mutual intent in the 
negotiations for their current contract was to start all new 
employees of the District, including appointees from civil 
service lists, at 70% of the assigned salary for a building 
custodian. 
The Director dismissed the charge against the District 
because no facts were pleaded which would show that any of 
the District's actions or decisions were improperly 
motivated, and the charge was untimely because it was filed 
in June 1990 regarding an April 1989 action, which was then 
known to Zink. He dismissed the charge against IUOE because 
no facts were alleged which would evidence that IUOE's 
actions or decisions were arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad 
faith. 
Zink excepts to the Director's finding that he was 
employed before April 1989 by an employer other than the 
District and to the Director's decision to dismiss the charge 
Board - U-11739 
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as untimely. We find the Director's conclusions of fact and 
law correct in both respects and dismiss the exceptions. 
Whatever personnel relationships may exist between the City 
^f^New-Yolrk~and~tHe~ District^ "they^are~di*fferent^^mployersr. 
The four-month period for filing charges is not extended by 
Zink's exploration of alternative means of redress. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
tA44rf£U 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
1/ See, e.g., New York State Public Employees Federation 
XFarkasl, 15 PERB «p005 (1982). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11015 
LOCAL 26517 AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
SAMUEL F. HOUSTON, ESQ. (STANLEY J. SLIWA, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
RAYMOND C. NOWAKOWSKI, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The City of Buffalo (City) excepts to two holdings in an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision made in connection with a 
charge filed by the City which alleges that Local 2 651, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (AFSCME) violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees1 
Fair Employment Act (Act). In particular, the charge alleges 
that AFSCME submitted seven nonmandatory subjects of negotiation 
to fact-finding over objection by the City. 
The ALJ found demands numbered 1, 2, 4 and 6 to be 
mandatory subjects of negotiation and demands numbered 3, 5 and 7 
to be nonmandatory matters which AFSCME improperly insisted upon 
pursuing to fact-finding. 
The only ALJ holdings which are at issue before us are 
those which found that the demands numbered 2 and 4 are 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. The demands are separately 
addressed below. 
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Demand No. 2 
Demand No. 2 provides in its entirety as follows: 
2. Union Officers and Representatives 
a) The City agrees that during working hours, on 
its premises, for reasonable periods of time, and 
without loss of payT^Union offrcersor—properly 
designated Union representatives shall be allowed to: 
1) Investigate and process grievances 
2) Post Union notices 
3) Distribute Union literature 
4) Solicit Union membership during other 
employees1 non-working time 
5) Attend negotiation meetings 
6) Transmit communications, authorized by the 
Local Union, or its officers, to the City or 
its representatives 
7) Consult with the City, its representatives, 
Local Union officers, or other Union 
representatives concerning the 
enforcement of any provisions of the 
Agreement 
b) The names of employees who are officers, 
and the names of other Union representatives who 
may represent employees shall be certified in 
writing to the City by the Union. 
c) Accredited Union representatives shall 
notify their department head or his designee 
whenever they wish to attend to Union business on 
City time. 
Grievance Committee 
a) The Union Grievance Committee may, upon 
request, meet with the department head once a month 
at a mutually convenient time. 
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b) The Union Grievance Committee shall 
consist of the Union President, Grievance Committee 
Chairman, and the Grievance Committee member from 
the particular department involved. 
c) All Grievance Committee meetings, where 
practical, shall be held during working hours, on 
the City's premises, and without loss of pay. 
The ALJ determined that the foregoing demand is properly 
characterized as a demand for access to employees on the 
employer's premises for purposes which are reasonably related 
to AFSCME's duties as negotiating agent, finding the demand 
to be mandatorily negotiable under the reasoning of this 
Board in Charlotte Valley CSD, 18 PERB fl3010 (1985) . 
The City argues in its exceptions before us that the 
demand seeks release time 
for activities which do not relate to 
•terms and conditions' of employment as 
that term is defined by the Civil Service 
Law Section 201(4). Specifically, Union 
literature and/or notices could 
conceivably relate to nonmandatory items. 
Yet, the clause, as written, does not 
attempt to restrict activities to only 
mandatory terms and conditions of 
employment, (emphasis in original) 
In Charlotte Valley, supra, this Board held (at 3024): 
Section 2 03 of the Act grants to public 
employees the right to be represented by 
their employee organization in collective 
negotiations over terms and conditions of 
employment and in the administration of 
grievances. This right of representation 
extends not only to the negotiation of 
terms and conditions of employment, but 
also to matters which aid the employee 
organization in the administration of 
grievances. We have, accordingly, 
acknowledged the right of employee 
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organizations to negotiate provisions 
relating to access to the employer's 
property to aid in gathering information 
necessary for its preparation for 
collective negotiations, in the 
investigation of grievances and in the 
proper administration of the bargaining 
agreement. [footnote: CSD of the City of 
A3rbanvv-6—PERB"^ 3-0-l-2-Y-19J7-3-)";~Oranae 
County Community College, 9 PERB f3068 
(1976)] We have emphasized that such 
access provisions must be reasonable in 
scope and limited to the furtherance of 
the employee organization's represen-
tation duties. 
We do not accept the City's assertion that the posting 
of union notices and the distribution of union literature on 
the City's premises renders demand No. 2 nonmandatory. The 
infringement upon the employer's property rights insofar as 
posting of notices and distribution of literature are 
concerned is minimal at most, 1/ and is certainly incidental 
to the main thrust of AFSCME's demand, which is to provide 
release time without loss of pay, in order to perform 
those functions. Release time, as discussed infra, in 
connection with demand No. 4, is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations even if not narrowly and strictly related to 
negotiations and the administration of the agreement 
because it relates to hours of work, which is itself a 
term and condition of employment. To the extent that the 
City contends that the demand is nonmandatory because 
it may relate to representation duties in connection 
i/see Charlotte Valley, supra, at 3024. 
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with nonmandatory matters, its argument is rejected. That 
such representation duties may involve the administration of 
grievances relating to a term of a collective bargaining 
agreement which may itself be a nonmandatory subject of 
h_egotiation,~but^was nevertheless 
does not in any way negate the right of representation and, 
therefore, access to the employer's premises for such 
purposes. 
While we have held that demands for union office space 
or meeting room space are nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation,-2/ we concur with the ALJ's finding that the at-
issue demand is appropriately characterized as an access 
demand and, to the extent that the demand seeks to infringe 
upon the City's property rights, it does so in connection 
with negotiations and grievance administration. The ALJ's 
holding that demand No. 2 is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations is affirmed, and, accordingly, that aspect of 
the City's charge is dismissed. 
Demand No. 4 
Demand No. 4 provides as follows: 
4. ATTENDANCE AT COMMON COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS 
Where matters pertaining to the Union 
activities are being considered by the Common 
Council, the Union President or his designee may 
attend the proceedings before the Council. 
•2/see, e.cr. , Amherst Police Club, Inc., 12 PERB ^3071 
(1979). 
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Notice shall be given to the department head 
of such attendance. 
The ALT found the foregoing demand to be a mandatory subject 
of negotiations, based upon her interpretation of the demand 
as~ar releaser timerilemandgeared "toward""^ uthT5ri"z"ing"—time"iof"f 
from work for a union president or designee to attend Common 
Council meetings. In its exceptions, the City appears to 
argue that release time to attend Common Council meetings is 
a mandatory subject of negotiations only if the subjects to 
be discussed at such Common Council meetings involve 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. The City apparently 
contends that no bargaining duty exists in connection with 
attendance at meetings at which nonmandatory items may be 
discussed. 
It is our determination that the ALT properly 
characterized this demand as a release time demand, to 
enable a union representative to attend Common Council 
meetings which are otherwise open to him/her, and that it is 
a mandatory subject of negotiations. Release time for union 
representatives need not be limited to time required for 
collective negotiations and/or the administration of 
grievances. It has been held to extend to other 
representational activities as well, including union 
administration matters, attendance at union meetings, 
Board - U-11015 
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conferences, and conventions, and to be a mandatory subject 
of negotiations. See City of Albany, 7 PERB fj[3078 and 3079, 
aff'd sub nom. City of Albany v. Helsbv. 38 N.Y. 2d 778, 
9 PERB 57005; UFFA, Local 23 04, IAFF, 10 PERB f3015, at 
3 032—(1977). 
The City's exception in this regard is accordingly 
denied. The ALJ holding which dismisses so much of the 
City's charge as alleges a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act in this regard is affirmed. 
Based upon the foregoing, the City's exceptions are 
denied, and the ALJ decision is affirmed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
//2D-12/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME LOCAL 826, COUNCIL 66, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10890 
-VILLAGEh OFENDieOTT, 
Respondent. 
FREDERICK J. PFEIFER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
GARY B. SLATER, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME Local 
826, Council 66, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALT) dismissal of its charge against the Village of 
Endicott (Village) which alleges, as amended, that the Village 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). 
AFSCME lists 17 exceptions which can be grouped into 2 
categories. In the first are several exceptions which object to 
the phraseology the ALT used in describing the record or the 
parties' arguments. In the second category are exceptions which 
allege that the ALT materially mischaracterized the charge. 
AFSCME argues that the ALT treated its charge as a unilateral 
change case when it alleges that the Village refused to negotiate 
in good faith regarding the hours of work for the Village's 
refuse workers as required by a January 1989 agreement, which 
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resolved an improper practice filed by the Village against 
AFSCME. That agreement was subsequently incorporated into the 
parties' current contract as Article XXII(3)(b), which provides 
as follows: 
Eighth (8)—consecutive -hours—of—work-shai-1 
constitute a work shift with the exception of all 
refuse removal employees where such employee's workday 
shall end upon the completion of his assigned route. 
However, refuse drivers will perform such maintenance 
and cleaning tasks that normally are required for that 
particular time of the year before leaving. Unless 
otherwise agreed, this provision shall cease to be 
effective May 1, 1989. 
AFSCME alleges that this clause preserves for it a statutory 
right to bargain regarding the refuse workers' hours of work 
until May 1, 1989. 
We dismiss the exceptions in the first identified category 
because in relevant respect the ALJ's statements are either 
materially accurate or nonprejudicial. 
As to the second category of exceptions, we agree that the 
charge as filed alleges a refusal to negotiate in good faith 
during several meetings between the parties at which the topic 
for discussion was whether and under what circumstances refuse 
workers would work the 8-hour days required of other unit 
employees or their shorter task-completion schedule. The ALJ's 
characterization of the charge, however, does not mean that he 
did not decide the issue presented by AFSCME. As we read the 
ALJ's decision, he held that AFSCME's agreement with the Village 
did not specifically reserve for it a right to negotiate the 
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refuse workers1 hours. The Village was not, therefore, under any 
statutory duty to negotiate because the parties' current 
contract otherwise fixed the workday for unit employees. As the 
Village was without a statutory duty to bargain, its conduct 
liur~iTfig~th^"TSeetlLTTg^ 
conduct could not have been subject to standards of statutory 
good faith. 
The initial issue for our consideration is whether AFSCME 
has a statutory right to negotiate the refuse workers1 hours. 
Our consideration of AFSCME's refusal to bargain allegations is 
complicated by some of our earlier decisions in which we 
dismissed similar charges because it was not indisputably clear 
from the parties' contract that they intended to preserve a 
statutory right to bargain. 1/ These dismissals were not 
jurisdictionally based; rather, they were discretionary 
declinations to make the contract interpretation necessary to the 
disposition of the claimed statutory violation so as to foster 
the parties' utilization of their contractual procedures and 
remedies. 
We have reexamined the policy choice which prompted our 
earlier dismissals of similar charges and now determine that we 
should exercise our jurisdiction over charges alleging a 
-^/Hunter-Tannersville Teachers Ass'n, 16 PERB f3109 
(1983) ; Incorporated Village of Lake Success, 17 PERB 5[3103 
(1984) . 
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statutory refusal to negotiate in good faith pursuant to a right 
allegedly reserved by agreement. 
A party is generally under no obligation to bargain for any 
change in a contract term which is to become effective before the 
iBxp±rat±on—ofthat-contractv Partiesy however,- may preserve" by ~ 
mutual agreement a statutory right to bargain when that right 
would otherwise be extinguished. These agreements are often 
contained within the collective bargaining agreement itself, 
typically as reopener clauses, but a continuing right to 
negotiate a subject covered by a contract may be otherwise 
evidenced. 
In this case, AFSCME's contract with the Village is the 
sole source of its claimed statutory right, and the Village's 
duty, to bargain about the refuse workers' hours. It is 
necessary to interpret the contract to reach the statutory 
question, but that contract interpretation is merely incidental 
to the disposition of the improper practice charge. At least 
since our adoption of former member Crowley's dissent in Town of 
Oranaetown. 3/ we have made those contract interpretations which 
are necessary to the determination of statutory violations, most 
often in assessing the merit of an employer's contractually-based 
waiver defense. 
^/Newfield CSD, 17 PERB [^3009 (1984). 
^8 PERB 5[3042 (1975) . We adopted former member 
Crowley's Oranqetown dissent in St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 
53058 (1977) . 
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Under past policy, a party with a clear reopener would get a 
merits determination, but if there was any uncertainty at all in 
the expression of the parties' intent, the charge was dismissed 
without any merits determination, although the statutory 
violation in the~ two ~^ ^ ^ At times-, — 
therefore, a charging party has been penalized for nothing more 
than poor drafting. 
For these reasons, and notwithstanding any prior decisions, 
we believe that our decision here to interpret as necessary those 
agreements which allegedly preserve for a party a statutory right 
to negotiate during the life of a contract about subjects 
otherwise covered by that contract better serves the policies of 
the Act than has our prior declination to exercise jurisdiction. 
Turning to the facts of this case, the "unless otherwise-
agreed" language in Article XXII(3)(b) contemplates a process 
through which such an agreement might be obtained, although it is 
unclear from the language of the provision itself as to whether 
the parties intended there to be negotiations regarding the 
refuse workers' hours or some lesser form of meetings. There is, 
however, testimony in the record relevant to the interpretation 
of the clause which, given the basis for his disposition of the 
charge, was not considered by the ALJ. AFSCME's representative 
testified to statements he and another ALJ made in the presence 
of all parties at the end of the conference on the Village's 
charge against AFSCME. AFSCME's representative's statement is 
Board - U-10890 
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directed exclusively to the meaning of a contract term, which 
was not actually drafted until after the conference was 
concluded. The ALJ's consideration of that statement is not 
barred by our policy which, in general, is intended to render 
settiement discussions- atpre-hearing-conferences-dTiadmTss±bl"e.~ 
The testimony of AFSCME's representative is, however, 
appropriately considered to constitute parol evidence of the 
meaning of an ambiguous contract term and is, therefore, 
admissible. Our policy is intended to preclude the admissibility 
of any statements allegedly made by an ALJ at a pre-hearing 
conference. Accordingly, the testimony concerning the ALJ's 
statement should not be considered on remand. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ALJ's decision 
and remand the matter to him for a new determination as to 
whether AFSCME reserved a statutory right to negotiate the 
refuse workers' hours under Article XXII(3)(b) and, if so, 
whether the Village refused, as alleged, to negotiate" that issue 
in good faith. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
IA^Z 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
//2E-12/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12057 
STATE OF NEW YORK (UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ. (LEONARD KERSHAW, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION 
This matter comes to us on the joint motion of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (CSEA) and the State of New York (Unified Court System) 
(State) to transfer an improper practice charge filed by CSEA 
to this Board pursuant to §204.4(a) of the Board's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) .1/ 
•1/section 204.4(a) Rules provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
Immediately subsequent to the conference referred 
to in §2 04.2(b) of this Part, and if one or more of 
the parties have made a request that a dispute 
involving primarily a disagreement as to the scope 
of negotiations under the act be processed 
expeditiously, or if the Director shall deem it 
appropriate to do so upon his own initiative, the 
Director shall so notify the Board and transmit the 
papers to the Board. The Board shall then inform 
the parties as to whether it will accord expedited 
treatment to the matter. . . . 
Board - U-12057 
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On or about November 15, 1990, CSEA filed an improper 
practice charge against the State, alleging a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) in that the State either repudiated the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement during its third year, or 
improperly refused to negotiate concerning compensation 
during the third year of the agreement if no agreement was in 
effect. The improper practice charge was filed following the 
enactment of a lag payroll system for certain State employees 
pursuant to Chapter 190, Sections 375 of the Laws of 1990 and 
following issuance of a decision in the matter of Association 
of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v. State of New 
York, (USDC SDNY), dated October 26, 1990. 
Simultaneously with the filing of the parties' joint 
motion to transfer this charge to the Board, CSEA submitted a 
motion to amend its improper practice charge and the State 
submitted a motion to dismiss the charge. In addition, the 
parties jointly submitted a stipulation of fact and exhibits. 
The Board has reviewed all of these submissions, and has 
considered the application of the parties to transfer this 
matter for expedited determination by this Board without 
resort to proceedings before the designated Administrative 
Law Judge (ALT). 
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In view of the significance and legal complexity of the 
issues raised by this charge, and the pendency of motions 
which must be decided prior to the issuance of a 
determination on its merits, and notwithstanding the parties' 
argument that a decision on the merits in this charge will 
affect the fashion in which the parties engage in ongoing 
collective negotiations, we determine that the factual and 
legal issues raised by the charge should be fully addressed 
by the parties to the assigned ALJ before resort, if any, to 
proceedings before this Board take place. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to transfer be, 
and it hereby is, denied. This matter is remanded to the 
assigned ALJ for further proceedings. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3A-12/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 887, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3467 
GREENBURGHCENTRALSCHOOL DISTRICT NOT 7, 
Employer, 
-and-
GREENBURGH CIVIL SERVICE ORGANIZATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority Vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Greenburgh Civil Service 
Organization has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Employees employed on a regular salary basis 
for the school calendar year or for a 10, 11, 
or 12 month period, and regularly assigned to a 
half-time or greater weekly work schedule in 
the classifications of Woodland H.S. school 
monitor, bus driver, switchboard operator/audit 
clerk, nurse, matron, custodian, maintenance 
person, typist, clerk, office assistant, 
secretary, senior typist, senior clerk, word 
processor, administrative secretary, console 
operatory—account-cl-erk7—regrsi-xaxT—o'ffice "~" 
assistant personnel, senior accounts clerk, 
senior bookkeeper, cleaner, mechanics helper, 
laborer, senior custodian, maintenance 
mechanic, head maintenance mechanic, bus 
dispatcher and auto maintenance man, and 
employees in the classifications of bus driver, 
school monitor and school bus monitor who are 
employed at an hourly rate and regularly work 
on a bi-weekly basis fifty hours or more. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Greenburgh Civil Service 
Organization. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
GAJ-&*£ A - H&*tvM£ &^-~
 L 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//3B-12/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3581 
NIAGARA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE and 
COUNTY OF NIAGARA, 
Employer, 
-and-
NIAGARA COUNTY WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYEES 
UNIT, LOCAL 832, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
ROBERT KLINGENSMITH, ESQ., for Niagara County Community 
College Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY 
EDWIN SHOEMAKER, ESQ., (JOHN BATT, Esq., Assistant County 
Attorney, of Counsel), for Niagara County Community College 
and County of Niagara 
NANCY HOFFMAN, ESQ., (STEVEN CRAIN, Esq., of Counsel), for 
Niagara County White Collar Employees Unit, Local 832, CSEA, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Local 182, American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, affiliated with New 
York State Council 66, AFL-CIO 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
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,, -, Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Niagara County Community 
College Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY has 
been—designated and selected by a-majority of the employees—of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be 
appropriate and described below, 1/ as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the County of Niagara and 
Niagara County Community College in the 
following positions: Typist, Senior Typist, 
Security Officer, Senior Programmer, Assistant 
Supervisor of Buildings and Grounds, Senior 
) Clerk, Stenographer, Telephone Operator, Account 
Clerk Steno, Messenger, ETV Operations 
Supervisor, Clerk, Supervisor of Central Office 
Services, Senior Library Clerk, Data Entry 
Operator, Principal Account Clerk, Payroll 
Clerk, Accounting Supervisor, Inventory Clerk, 
Senior A/V Technician, Senior Security Officer, 
Principal Library Clerk, Computer Programmer, 
Computer Operator, Senior Stenographer, Senior 
Account Clerk, Cash Account Clerk, Senior 
Computer Operator, Data Processing Control 
Clerk, Administrative Assistant/Schools, 
Principal Audit Clerk, Registered Professional 
Nurse, Multilith Machine Operator, Principal 
Clerk, Senior Account Clerk, Assistant Multilith 
Machine Operator, Part Time Stenographer, Part 
Time Senior Clerk, Account Clerk Typist, Part 
Time Typist, Part Time Messenger, and Part Time 
Campus Security Officer. 
Excluded: All managerial and confidential employees and 
faculty covered by Niagara County Community 
College Faculty Association. 
1/ Subsequent to the uniting decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation [23 PERB 54052 
(1990)], the parties agreed that additional titles should be 
included in the unit. The unit described reflects that 
agreement. 
Certification - C-3581 page -3 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Niagara County Community 
College Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
-wagesT-hours,—andotherterms and-conditions of-employment,—or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3C-12/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3588 




LOCAL 182, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, 
COUNTY and MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, Affiliated 
with NEW YORK STATE COUNCIL 66, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
ROBERT KLINGENSMITH, ESQ., for Niagara County Community 
College Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY 
EDWIN SHOEMAKER, ESQ., (JOHN BATT, Esq., Assistant County 
Attorney, of Counsel), for Niagara County Community College 
and County of Niagara 
NANCY HOFFMAN, ESQ., (STEVEN CRAIN, Esq., of Counsel), for 
Niagara County White Collar Employees Unit, Local 832, CSEA, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Local 182, American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, affiliated with New 
York State Council 66, AFL-CIO 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
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Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act, 
~TT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that"the""T^iagar^"C'ounty~Coimuirrty" 
College Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be 
appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the County of Niagara and 
Niagara County Community College in the 
following positions: Building Maintenance 
Person I, Building Maintenance Person II, 
Building Maintenance Person III, Stores Clerk, 
Campus Watchperson, Maintenance - Custodial, 
Head Cleaner, Groundskeeper, Groundskeeper III, 
and Custodian. 
Excluded: All managerial and confidential employees and 
faculty represented by the Niagara County 
Community College Faculty Association. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Niagara County 
Community College Educational Support Personnel Association, 
NEA/NY. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
1/ Subsequent to the uniting decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation [23 PERB [^4052 
(1990)], the parties agreed that additional titles should be 
included in the unit. The unit described reflects that 
agreement. 
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obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L.Eisenberg, Member 
//3D-12/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FRATERNAL ORDER - NEW YORK STATE 
TROOPERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3735 




POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE NEW YORK 
STATE TROOPERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Troopers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
JrZ^e-e^. /?•\A/&AAS-?L<J &^~^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/SLC^UJZ-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe: 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Investigators, Senior Investigators, 
Investigative Specialists. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
